What If Phase One Were the Final Phase?

Would the phase one situation in Gaza, like the second phase of Oslo, serve Israel's long-term interests? The answer, given the great difficulty in disarming the terrorists, could well be yes.

By Michael Oren

These past days have witnessed a cavalcade of senior Trump administration officials to Israel. Their goal is to maintain the ceasefire in Gaza—phase one of the president’s twenty-point peace plan—and to discuss ways of implementing phase two, the disarmament of Hamas. But what if the second phase cannot be realized? What would be the ramifications for Israel, America, and the Middle East? Would the continuation of phase one be such a catastrophe?

But would the phase one situation in Gaza, like the second phase of Oslo, serve Israel’s long-term interests? The answer, given the great difficulty in disarming the terrorists, could well be yes.

For years after the signing of the Oslo Accords of 1993, peace negotiators spoke about “phase two” of the process. In this stage, the Palestinian Authority would enjoy political and military control over Area A of Judea and Samaria and political control over Area B. The largest part of the territories, Area C, would be under Israel’s exclusive rule. Opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state that could seriously threaten the Jewish state, many Israelis were happy to view “phase two” as the final stage of Oslo.

The twenty-point peace plan of President Trump is now in its first phase. Like the Palestinian Authority in the 1990s, Hamas today controls a relatively small part of Gaza. The majority of the Strip remains under Israeli rule. Though President Trump has repeatedly pledged to disarm the terrorists, his means for doing so remain unclear. Closely monitored by U.S. and foreign military observers, Israel is unlikely to restart major military operations in Gaza, especially in areas now repopulated by tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians. White House officials, meanwhile, have repeatedly pledged “no American boots on the ground” in Gaza. The status quo in the Strip may indeed prove permanent.

But would the phase one situation in Gaza, like the second phase of Oslo, serve Israel’s long-term interests? The answer, given the great difficulty in disarming the terrorists, could well be yes.

As long as Hamas retains its guns, no country will invest in rebuilding the areas under its control. The civilian population there will continue to live in debris and misery. By contrast, the 53% of Gaza occupied by the IDF could be rapidly reconstructed by the Saudis, the Emiratis, and others. Palestinians there will enjoy a quality of life unthinkable in Gaza City. Pressure on Hamas would only increase, as would Hamas’s oppression of the local population. And as long as Hamas remains a terrorist force in Gaza, the chances of creating a Palestinian state that the majority of Israelis still oppose will be much reduced.

Israel must continue to cooperate closely with the Trump administration in pressuring Hamas’s Middle East patrons and in taking military measures to further downgrade Hamas. Any attempt by the terrorists to launch attacks in Israeli-controlled Gaza or in Judea and Samaria must be met with an immediate and massive military retaliation against Hamas. Israel and the United States must work vigorously to prevent European countries and international organizations from enriching Hamas as they have in the past by funding supposedly civilian projects. Aid must continue to flow into the Strip, but every effort must be made to prevent it from falling into Hamas’s hands. Turkey, an ally of the Muslim Brotherhood of which Hamas is a branch, must be denied any role whatsoever in Gaza.

At the same time, though, Israel should plan for a status quo that may serve our long-term interests. If all of Gaza cannot be transformed into a prosperous, peaceful neighbor, then a prolonged “phase two” might be the optimal outcome. Other Muslim states, above all Saudi Arabia, could join the Abraham Accords. The Pax Americana could be expanded throughout much of the Middle East.